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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ectiveness of corporate tax incentives in reducing the
e¤ective tax rate (ETR) on income from capital to stimulate business investment dur-
ing economic downturns. We focus on tax rate incentives (TRIs), such as corporate
tax rate cuts, and tax base incentives (TBIs), such as increased capital allowances.
The standard economic theory states that TRIs reduce the ETR by decreasing tax
payments on corporate prots. TBIs instead reduce the ETR as they defer rmstax
payments, in turn increasing the present value of dividend distribution. However, this
theory does not consider that, in reality, rms face accounting constraints preventing
any distribution of cash ows arising from TBIs. For this reason, the standard eco-
nomic analysis overstates the benet of any TBI relative to that of TRIs. The paper
incorporates accounting constraints on dividend policy into the model for the compu-
tation of the ETR and employs the new model to recalculate ETRs in the US and in
the UK during 1980-2010. The empirical results conrm that the benet of TBIs is
signicantly overstated by the standard theory, and tax rate cuts are more e¤ective in
reducing the ETR. We show that this result holds regardless of the form of investment
nance (retained earning, new equity and debt), the type capital asset (building and
plant and machinery), the level of capital income taxation (corporate and sharehold-
ers), and the value of accounting depreciation relative to economic depreciation.
Keywords: Capital income taxation; dividend policy; e¤ective marginal
tax rates; nancial constraints.
JEL classication: H3.
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1 Introduction
Over the last thirty years, both the United States and United Kingdom have
relied on a number of tax incentives to stimulate business investment, capital
accumulation and faster growth during periods of economic downturn or re-
covery. The principle underpinning a policy based on the provision of a tax
incentive is a well established one in the economic theory: tax incentives reduce
the e¤ective tax burden on income from capital in turn increasing the after tax
rate of return from investment. This increase in return should then raise de-
mand for capital goods. The focus of this paper is to evaluate which type of tax
incentive is more e¤ective in reducing the tax burden on income from capital.1
A very di¤erent range of tax incentives has been employed in the United States
and in the United Kingdom over the last 30 years. We narrow the scope of our
analysis to generic and economy-wide tax incentives granted to domestic cor-
porate investors regardless of any specic characteristic of the business, such as
its location, size, or type. Within these margins, a lower e¤ective tax burden on
income from capital can be achieved either through a reduction of the statutory
tax rate levied on capital income at both corporate or personal level (tax rate
incentive, hereafter TRI) or, given the headline tax rate, through a reduction
of the corporate tax base (tax base incentive, hereafter TBI). The key issue we
investigate in the paper is which of the two types of incentives, TRI or TBI, is
more e¤ective in reducing the tax burden on income from capital.
Following the standard economic literature started by King and Fullerton
(1984), and then further developed by Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998b, 2003), we
measure the tax burden on business investment through the e¤ective tax rate
(ETR) on income from capital. There are two main reasons for choosing the
ETR proposed in this literature as the indicator of the e¤ective tax burden on
income from capital against which to compare the impact of TRIs and TBI.
First, ETRs are widely employed by policy makers for cross-country compar-
isons of the corporate tax burden and assessment of capital income taxation
systems.2 Second, ETRs are particularly useful to evaluate and compare the
e¤ectiveness of TRIs relative to TBIs, since they represent simple indicators
which take into account simultaneously how tax rates and tax base rules deter-
mine the overall tax burden on income from capital. Of course, tax codes set
a large number of rules for the determination of the tax base, which cannot be
taken simultaneously into account by a single indicator. We follow the standard
corporate tax literature and therefore focus only on tax depreciation allowances
for capital spending: as a result, we consider as TBI an increase in the rate of
tax depreciation allowances.
1Whether a lower tax burden on income from capital translates in a higher demand for
investment goods is an empirical question which has been extensively investigated in the eco-
nomic literature, and it is out of the scope of this paper. See, for example, Backus, Henriksen
and Storesletten (2008); Burnham and Ozanne (2006); De Mooij and Ederveen (2003); Dev-
ereux and Gri¢ th (1998a); Devereux, Gri¢ th and Klemm (2002); Devereux, Lockwood and
Redoano (2008); and Slemrod (1990).
2See, for example, Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2005, 2006); European Commission (1992,
2001); Institute for Fiscal Studies (2009); and OECD (1991, 2007).
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The empirical evidence suggests that lower corporate tax rates and/or tem-
porary increase of tax depreciation allowances have been a recurrent feature of
corporate tax policy in the United States and in the United Kingdom during
economic downturns over the last 30 years. However, as tax rates have continu-
ously declined over this period of time, TBIs have become the more predominant
form of tax incentive.
To evaluate their impact on the ETR, we compare and contrast the rela-
tive e¤ects of TRIs and TBIs within two investment frameworks. The rst is
consistent with the standard neoclassical theory, and assumes that shareholders
wealth increases following either a TRI or a TBI, as both types of incentives
increase the present value of dividend income. In particular, the standard eco-
nomic theory advocates that TBIs, such as higher tax depreciation allowances
for capital expenditure, increase the rate of investment because they defer tax
payments to the future, in turn raising the present value of dividend income.
This theory, however, neglects that accounting standards in OECD countries
impose nancial constraints on dividend policy preventing rms from distrib-
uting to shareholders any cash ows arising from deferred taxation. This is
because TBIs are normally temporary tax incentives designed to provide rms
with extra cash ow to undertake new investment, rather than distribute higher
dividend income. As a result, a second investment model is designed to fully in-
corporate the e¤ect of dividend policy constraints imposed on rms benetting
from a TBI. We show that within this second model, the benet from a TBI is
signicantly lower than that predicted by the standard theory, hence TRIs are
more likely to reduce the ETR than TBIs. In turn, this implies that as tax rates
continue to decline in both the United States and the United Kingdom, there
will be less and less scope to exploit the most e¤ective tax tool (the tax cut) to
stimulate business investment during recessions.3
Constraints on dividend policy linked with TBIs, as dened by the Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles in the United States and the International
Financial Reporting Standards in the United Kingdom, require rms to set full
provision for any deferred tax asset or liability arising from temporary di¤er-
ences between the accounting value of assets and liabilities and their value for
tax purposes. The importance of incorporating accounting constraints in invest-
ment models for tax policy analysis has already been pointed out by a relevant
branch of the economic literature.4 Although the actual constraint depends on
the gap between the accounting and the tax evaluation of assets and liabilities,
most of this literature assumes that the accounting value of assets and liabilities
fully reects their economic value. This corresponds to assume that accounting
depreciation equals economic depreciation in our analysis, which is a plausible
assumption not least because over the past 10-15 years accounting standards
3 Indeed, even if the corporate tax rate reached zero, a government can still engineer a tax
rate cut by granting a tax credit, which in this case would result in a direct income transfer
from the government to the corporate sector. It is doubtful, however, that such policy will be
politically and nancially feasible.
4See, for example, Boadway and Bruce (1979), Kanniainen and Södersten (1994 and 1995),
King (1974), Sørensen (1995), and Mills (2006).
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followed by United States and United Kingdom companies have increased their
exibility in order to align accounting depreciation to economic depreciation.5
Nevertheless, we departure from the conventional literature and generalise our
constrained version of the neoclassical investment model allowing the size of
provision for deferred taxes to depend on the gap between accounting and tax
depreciation, as prescribed in the accounting standards, the former being di¤er-
ent from economic depreciation. Our analysis also di¤ers in four instances from
Polito (2009), who incorporates accounting constraints on dividend policy into
the Jorgenson (1963) investment model and uses this new framework to compute
ETRs in the special case of domestic investment nanced by retained earnings.
First, this paper adopts a discrete time approach, while Polito (2009) employs
the alternative, though mathematically equivalent, continuous time version of
Jorgenson (1963) model. Second, since the focus here is on the impact of TRIs
and TBIs on the ETR, this paper shows analytically how changes in tax rates
and tax depreciation impact di¤erently on the ETR in the unconstrained and
constrained version of the model, while this type of analysis is not carried out
in Polito (2009) which focuses on the e¤ect of changes in investment protabil-
ity under the two models. Third, this paper shows that the negative e¤ect of
dividend policy constraints holds for every form of investment nance (retained
earnings, new equity and debt), while Polito (2009) considers retained earnings
alone. Fourth, the empirical application of this paper focuses on the time series
analysis of ETRs in the United States and in the United Kingdom for the whole
period 1979-2010, while Polito (2009) considers 5 EU countries in 2008 alone.
Our empirical ndings show that the unconstrained model signicantly over-
states the benet of temporary increase in tax allowances for capital spending,
especially when investment is nanced by retained earnings and yields a low rate
of return: in other words, TBIs are far less e¤ective than TRIs. Tax rate cuts
are e¤ective in reducing the ETR, unless investment is nanced by debt and
yields a low rate of return. These results are shown to hold when considering
taxation at corporate level alone, taxation at personal level, for investment in
both plant and machinery and industrial buildings, and regardless of the value
of accounting depreciation relative to the rate of economic depreciation.
The paper is organised as follow. In Section 2 the approach developed by De-
vereux and Gri¢ th to calculate ETR is briey described. We consider the ETR
for a domestic investment nanced by either retained earnings or new equity
or debt and use the framework to evaluate how TRIs and TBIs impact on the
ETR. Section 3 claries how accounting constraints limit dividend policy when
rms can defer tax payments following a TBI, and illustrates the implications
of these constraints for the cost of capital. Section 4 introduces dividend pol-
icy constraints into the neoclassical framework and revisits the e¤ects of TRIs
and TBIs within this constrained model. Section 5 briey presents data on the
taxation of income from capital the United States and in the United Kingdom
5 Indeed, the IAS 16 (International GAAP 2010) does not prescribe any specic method
and/or rate of depreciation for accounting purposes, as it requires the depreciation charge to
reect the pattern of consumption of the benets the assets brings over its useful life, which
is essentially consistent with economic depreciation.
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from 1979 to 2010. Section 6 summarises the results obtained by using these
data to compute ETRs in both countries under the two models over the last
thirty years. Section 7 states our conclusions. Appendix A at the end of the
paper describes in detail all tax data used in this paper.
2 The ETR on income from capital
The Devereux and Gri¢ th model (Devereux and Gri¢ th, 1998a and 1998b; Eu-
ropean Commission, 2001; Devereux, 2004) considers a competitive rm seeking
to maximise its shareholders wealth, while facing a perfectly elastic supply of
capital and a frictionless capital market, where it can borrow and lend at the
constant nominal interest rate i. The nominal interest rate is related to the
real rate r through the Fisher equation (1 + i) = (1 + r) (1 + ), where  is the
constant ination rate from t to t+1. Investment choices are riskless and taken
in the absence of bankruptcy costs.
The model considers a simple one period investment: it is supposed that
in a period t the rm increases its capital stock by making an investment of
one unit, while decreasing its capital stock by the same amount in the following
period t+1.
The increase in the shareholders wealth induced by the investment is equal
to the net present value of the economic rent generated:
Wt =
1X
s=0
Dt+s  Nt+s
(1 + )
s ; (1)
where D and N denote the change in dividend income and new equity
issues, from period t onward;  is the after-tax income received by shareholders
for any unit increase in dividend income;  is the shareholdersdiscount rate.
In particular,  =
 
1 md = (1  z) (1  c), where md, z and c measure the
personal tax rates on dividend income, accrued capital gains and the imputation
rate, respectively;6 and  = i
 
1   i = (1  z), with  i denoting the personal
tax rate on interest income.
Dividend income is computed in any period t from the identity between
sources and uses of funds
Bt +Nt +Qt (Kt 1)  iBt 1 = Dt + It + Tt; (2)
where Bt denotes the change in the stock of debt in period t; Qt (Kt 1) is out-
put in period t depending on the stock of capital in the previous period, Kt 1,
having normalised prices of output and capital goods to unity; iBt 1 measures
interest payments on the outstanding stock of debt; It is the investment under-
taken in period t, and Tt measures the period t corporate tax liability.7 The
6The denition of  implies that,  R 1, when the net tax on dividend income is lower,
equal or higher than the capital gain tax rate.
7Qt (:) is a standard neoclassical investment function, which is continuos and twice di¤er-
entiable, with positive rst derivative and negative second derivative.
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capital stock evolves according to the capital accumulation equation
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It; (3)
where  is the rate of economic depreciation of the capital stock.
The tax liability is formulated as
T ct = 

Qt (Kt 1)  iBt 1   
 
It +K
T
t 1

; (4)
where  is the statutory tax rate,  is the tax allowance on capital spending,
and KTt 1 is the tax-written-down value of the capital stock at the end of period
t, which evolves according to
KTt = (1  )KTt 1 + It: (5)
Assuming that the tax code grants tax depreciation allowances on a declining
balance basis, the present value of the tax saving generated by the allowances
per unit of investment in physical capital, A, is measured as
A = + 
1X
s=1

1  
1 + 
s
= 
(1 + )
+ 
; (6)
where  denotes the tax saving generated by the initial period (t) capital
allowance and 
1P
s=1

1 
1+
s
measures the present discounted value of the tax
saving from any capital allowance received from t = 1 onward. Equation (6)
immediately shows that an increase in either the corporate tax rate or the capital
allowance rate raises the present discounted value of the tax saving from capital
allowances since
@A
@
= 
(1 + )
+ 
> 0;
@A
@
= 
 (1 + )
(+ )
2 > 0:
Following Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967), the traditional
method of measuring the impact of capital income taxation on investment
choices is based on the maximisation of the net return from capital investment
in equation (1) with respect to Kt, subject to the constraints in equations (2)
to (5). Assuming that the investment is nanced by retained earnings, the rst
order condition for t = 0; 1; 2; ::: is:
  (1 A) + 
1 + 
[(1  ) (p+ ) (1 + ) + (1  ) (1 A) (1 + )]  0:
(7)
The rst term on the left hand side of (7) is the net present value of the
cost of the investment for the shareholders and the second one is the after tax
present value of the return from the investment, which includes after tax gross
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nominal return (1  ) (p+ ) (1 + ) and the residual nominal value of capital
(1  ) (1 A) (1 + ), with p denoting the net nancial return generated by
investment in physical capital 8 .
For marginal investment projects equation (7) holds with equality and it can
be solved for the user cost of capital p = ~p. It holds with inequality whenever
investment projects yield an expected rate of return in excess of the marginal
rate.9 In this second case, physical capital generates an economic rent R, namely
a rate of return which exceeds the marginal rate. Hence, the investment condi-
tion in equation (7) can be formulated as
RU;RE =

1 + 
f(1  ) (p+ ) (1 + )  [+  (1 + )  ] (1 A)g  0;
(8)
where RU;RE denotes the after tax economic rent, the subscript U indicating the
absence of any constraint on dividend policy ("unconstrained" dividend policy)
and RE specifying that the investment is nanced by retained earnings.
Note that in the absence of taxes, the above reduces to
R =
p  r
1 + r
 0; (9)
which holds with equality for marginal investment projects.
The applied version of the model extends the relation in equation (8) to the
case of investment nanced by either new equity or debt. When investment is
nanced by new equity issues, in the current period the rms need to raise new
equity for the net investment cost 1  . Consequently, compared to the case
of retained earnings, in the current period shareholders contribute by 1   
but their dividend payout increases by  (1  ). In the subsequent period
the amount (1  ) (1  ) is distributed to shareholders as a repurchase of
equity. Combining these e¤ects, the economic rent for investment nanced by
new equity, RU;NE , can be formulated as
RU;NE = RU;RE    (1  ) (1  )
1 + 
: (10)
Hence, under the standard formulation of the model, the impact of new equity
nance on the economic rent depends upon the taxation of dividend income
relative to capital gains, as summarised by the parameter . When the tax
system does not discriminate between dividend income and capital gains,  = 1,
then the value of the after tax economic rent under new equity nance is the
same as under retained earnings. When dividend income is taxed more than
capital gains,  < 1, then the economic rent under new equity nance is lower
than under retained earnings, since it is more e¢ cient to nance investment
8 In other words p represents the return measured in terms of EBIT (earnings before income
and taxes): it is given by p =
@Qt+1(Kt)
@Kt
  
9See Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998b, 2003), for a justication of this condition in partial
equilibrium investment models.
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using the source of income subject to the smaller tax burden (retained earnings).
Viceversa, when dividend income is taxed less than capital gains,  > 1, then the
economic rent under new equity nance is higher than under retained earnings,
because investment is nanced with the less expensive form of nance.
Under debt nance, shareholders borrow the amount 1    to nance in-
vestment. Hence, compared to the case of retained earnings, in the current
period shareholders receive an amount  (1  ), which is repaid with interest
in the following period. After taking into account that interest payments are
deductible for corporate tax purposes, the net cost of repaying debt reduces
the size of the dividend payment in period t + 1, relative to the retained earn-
ings case, by the amount  (1  ) [1 + i (1  )]. Combining these e¤ects, the
economic rent for investment nanced by debt, RU;B , is described as
RU;B = RU;RE +
 (1  ) [  i (1  )]
1 + 
; (11)
where the second term on the right-hand side of equation (11) measures the
benet from debt nancing.
E¤ectively, under debt nance the rm postpones the payment of the cost of
capital by one period. If the interest rate is not taxed at personal level,  = i,
and the cost of borrowing is undeductible from the corporate tax base, then
RU;B = RU;RE and there is no benet from debt nance. If the interest rate is
not taxed at personal level,  = i, and the cost of borrowing is deductible from
the corporate tax base, then
RU;B = RU;RE +
 (1  ) i
1 + i
;
which shows that debt nancing increases the economic rent. If the cost of
borrowing is undeductible from the corporate tax base and interest income is
taxed at personal level, then
RU;B = RU;RE +
 (1  ) (  i)
1 + 
;
which shows that the benet of debt nancing depends on the value of  relative
to i, as RU;B R RU;RE for  R i.
Equations (8) - (11) provide formulations of the economic rent under alter-
native forms of nance which are fairly standard in the corporate tax literature,
and can be used to measure the ETR on income from capital, dened as the
di¤erence between the economic rent before and after taxes, measured as a
proportion of the discounted value of p:
ETRU;j =
R  RU;j
p= (1 + r)
; (12)
where the subscript j = RE;NE;B distinguishes
between three forms of investment nance. Equation (12) shows that any tax
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measure that increases (reduces) the after economic rent RU;j has the e¤ect of
reducing (increasing) the ETR on income from capital.
We can now employ these measures to evaluate how TRIs and TBIs impact
on the ETR according to the traditional neoclassical investment theory.
2.1 Retained earnings
We rst study how the ETRU;RE varies with investment protability. This is
important because it reveals how the e¤ective tax burden on income from capital
is likely to change over the business cycle. After incorporating the economic rent
in equation (8) into the formula for the ETR in (12) and rearranging, the ETR
is formulated as
ETRU;RE = 1 r
p
  (1 + r) 
(1 + ) p
[(1  ) (pU;RE + ) (1 + )  [+  (1 + )  ] (1 A)] :
Assuming that interest income and capital gains are not taxed at personal level,
i = , the above simplies to
ETRU;RE = 1   (1  )  r (1  )   [   (r + )A]
p
:
If dening the present value of the tax saving which would be generated by
economic depreciation as
A = 
1X
s=1

1  
1 + r
s
=

r + 
(13)
the above becomes
ETRU;RE = 1   (1  )  r (1  )   (r + ) (A  A)
p
: (14)
Equation (14) shows that the ETRU;RE includes two components: the rst
term, 1    (1  ), is the permanent component of the ETR, entirely depen-
dent on the government design of the capital income taxation system at both
corporate and personal level. The second term is the temporary component of
the e¤ective tax burden, which is related to investment protability. Note that
using the denitions in equations (6) and (13) and in the absence of taxation at
shareholders level,  = 1, the ETR in equation (14) becomes
ETRU;RE =  +
 [   (1 + r)]
p
which shows that the ETR R  if  R (1 + r). We now consider two special
cases. First we assume that the tax code does not grant the rst year tax
depreciation allowance. Hence, A =

r+ and the ETR becomes
ETRU;RE =  +
 (   )
p
9
which shows that the ETR R  if  R . Therefore, if the tax system allows
just the deduction of economic depreciation, it follows that
ETR =  :
The sensitiveness of the ETRU;RE to investment protability is measured
from (14) as
@ETRU;RE
@p
=
r (1  )   (r + ) (A  A)
p2
:
The above shows that the sensitiveness of the ETR to investment protability
depends on the taxation of dividend income relative to capital gains and the
di¤erence between tax and economic depreciation. In general, the above expres-
sion is always negative whenever dividend income is taxed more than capital
gains and tax depreciation exceeds economic depreciation. In particular, we
note the following results:
1. @ETRU;RE@p = 0, when dividend income is taxed as capital gains ( = 1)
and tax depreciation equals economic depreciation (A = A);
2. @ETRU;RE@p =
r(1 )
p2 ; when dividend income is taxed di¤erently from capital
gains ( 6= 1), but tax depreciation equals economic depreciation(A =
A);
3. @ETRU;RE@p =
 (r+)(A A)
p2 ; when dividend income is taxed as capital
gains ( = 1) but tax depreciation exceeds economic depreciation (A <
A).
Investment protability is pro-cyclical, hence when there is no discrimina-
tion between dividend income and capital gains in the tax system, the e¤ective
tax burden on income from capital is anti-cyclical as long as tax depreciation
allowances exceed economic depreciation. In this case the ETR increases during
phases of expansions, while falling during contractions.
The e¤ect of a TBI on the ETR for investment nanced by retained earnings
can be measured by evaluating the impact of an increase in the tax allowance
on capital spending:
@ETRU;RE
@
=   (r + )
p
@A
@
; (15)
which shows that an increase in the tax depreciation allowance rate reduces the
ETR. This result has a straightforward
economic interpretation: a higher tax allowance on capital spending shrinks
the tax base in the current period relative to the future, in turn increasing the
present value of dividend income distributable to
shareholders. The increase in the economic rent resulting form the higher cap-
ital allowance results then in the reduction of the ETR. Conversely, the ETR
increases following a reduction in the capital allowance.
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We can also study how the ETR responds to a TRI. After di¤erentiating
equation (14) with respect to the corporate income tax rate we obtain:
@ETRU;RE
@
= 

1 +

p
  (1 + r)(r + )
p (r + )


(16)
Hence, in principle, an increase of the corporate tax rate has an ambiguous e¤ect
on the economic rent and the ETR. The rst two terms in the square brackets
measure the impact of the higher tax rate on the gross return on investment,
which clearly increases the ETR. The last term measures the impact of a change
in the corporate tax rate on the ETR through the tax base. This is negatively
related to the ETR since the higher corporate tax rate increases the present
value of the tax saving from capital allowances, in turn reducing the tax base.
Notice that when dividend income is taxed as capital gains,  = 1, if  = ,
the right hand side of the above reduces to 1, which shows that a TRI reduces
the ETR one for one when tax depreciation equals economic depreciation. More
generally, if  6= , then @ETRU;RE@ R 0 when (p+ ) (r + ) R  (1 + r)(r + ) :
2.2 New equity
Combining the denitions in equations (12) and (10), the ETR is formulated as
ETRU;NE = ETRU;RE + 
(1  ) (1  ) (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
: (17)
The above shows that the ETR under new equity nance includes two terms.
The rst measures the e¤ective tax burden on the present value of dividend
income generated by the investment, as in the case of retained earnings. The
second term measures the impact on the e¤ective tax burden of new equity
nance relative to retained earnings, which in turn depends on the taxation of
dividend income relative to capital gains, as measured by . When dividend
income is taxed as capital gains,  = 1, then the ETRU;NE equals that under
retained earnings. If dividend income is taxed more (less) than capital gains,
 < (>)1, then new equity nance is less (more) e¢ cient than retained earnings
nance and the ETRU;NE is higher (lower) than ETRU;RE .
From equation (17) it follows that the sensitiveness of the ETR to changes
in investment protability is measured by
@ETRU;NE
@p
=
@ETRU;RE
@p
   (1  ) (1  ) (1 + r)
(1 + ) p2
;
which shows that the cost ( < 1) or the benet ( > 1) of new equity nance
relative to retained earnings fades away as investment protability raises.
Equation (17) also shows that the impact of new equity nance relative to
retained earnings depends on tax saving generated by the rst year allowance
rate, . The rst year tax depreciation allowance has the e¤ect of reducing the
cost of capital in the rst period, in turn implying that the rm needs to rely
less on any other form of nance.
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The e¤ect of a TBI under new equity nance is measured by di¤erentiating
with respect to  the ETR in equation (17), which yields
@ETRU;NE
@
=
@ETRU;RE
@
   (1  ) (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
: (18)
The two terms on the right-hand side of equation (18) show that a TBI has
two e¤ects on the ETR under new equity nance. First, the increase of the tax
depreciation allowance reduces the ETRU;RE since it raises the present value of
dividend income distributable to shareholders. The second e¤ect refers to the
impact on the nancial benet from new equity nance relative to retained earn-
ings. Consider the case of new new equity nance being the most tax e¢ cient
form of nance,  > 1. In this case, the ETR on investment nanced by new
equity issue increases relative to that under retained earnings taxation because
by reducing the proportion of investment nanced with the most e¢ cient form
of nance the higher capital allowance reduces the benet of new equity nance
relative to retained earnings. The opposite occurs when  < 1.
Note that since the tax saving from tax depreciation allowance is propor-
tional to the statutory corporate tax rate, it follows immediately that increases
of the corporate tax rate will have an e¤ect on the new equity component of the
ETR similar to that of an increase of the capital allowance. In fact, the impact
of a change in the corporate tax rate on the economic rent generated is given
by
@ETRU;NE
@
=
@ETRU;RE
@
   (1  ) (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
:
Consequently, a TRI increases (reduces) the nancial benet of new equity
nance relative to retained earnings when  < 1 ( > 1).
2.3 Debt
Combining (12) with (11), the e¤ective tax burden on debt nanced investment
is formulated as
ETRU;B = ETRU;RE    (1  ) [  i (1  )] (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
: (19)
Hence, the overall impact of debt nancing on the e¤ective tax burden, as
measured by the second term on the right hand side depends on    i (1  ).
This term is positive whenever the personal tax rate on interest income is lower
than the corporate income tax rate ( i < ), in turn implying that ETRU;B <
ETRU;RE , which is a condition generally holding for most of OECD countries.
Several special cases may be noted here. If the interest rate is not taxed
at personal level,  = i, and the cost of borrowing is undeductible from the
corporate tax base, then ETRU;B = ETRU;RE and there is no benet from
debt nance. If the interest rate is not taxed at personal level,  = i, and the
cost of borrowing is deductible from the corporate tax base, then
ETRU;B = ETRU;RE    i (1  ) (1 + r)
(1 + i) p
;
12
which shows that debt nancing increases reduces the ETR. If the cost of bor-
rowing is undeductible from the corporate tax base and interest income is taxed
at personal level, then
ETRU;B = ETRU;RE    (1  ) [  i] (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
:
and the benet of debt nancing depends on the value of  relative to i, as
ETRU;B S ETRU;RE when  R i.
Equation (19) shows that the benet of debt nance on the ETR increases
as investment protability raises since
@ETRU;B
@p
=
@ETRU;RE
@p
+ 
(1  ) [  i (1  )] (1 + r)
(1 + ) p2
:
The impact of a TBI on the ETRU;B is measured by
@ETRU;B
@
=
@ETRU;RE
@
+ 
 [  i (1  )] (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
; (20)
which shows that an increase in the tax depreciation allowance has two opposite
e¤ects on the ETR. On the one hand, it reduces the ETR as it increases the
present value of dividend income distributable to shareholders. On the other
hand, it reduces the benet of debt nancing relative to retained earnings as
the higher capital allowance decreases the amount of interest income deductible
form the tax base.
As previously pointed out, several special cases can occur depending on the
taxation of interest income at personal and corporate level. If interest income
is not deductible from the corporate tax base and is not taxed at personal level,
then the above becomes
@ETRU;B
@
=
@ETRU;RE
@
:
If the interest rate is not taxed at personal level,  = i but the cost of
borrowing is deductible from the corporate tax base, then
@ETRU;B
@
=
@ETRU;RE
@
+ 
i2 (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
:
This result has the following economic interpretation. A TBI has the e¤ect of
reducing the proportion of investment nanced by borrowing, in turn reducing
the benet of debt nancing relative to retained earnings.
If the cost of borrowing is undeductible from the corporate tax base and
interest income is taxed at personal level, then
@ETRU;B
@
=
@ETRU;RE
@
+ 
 [  i] (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
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which shows that an increase in the tax depreciation allowance reduces the
relative benet of debt nancing.
Finally, the impact of an increase in the corporate tax rate is measured by
@ETRU;B
@
=
@ETRU;RE
@
+  f [  i (1  )]  (1  ) ig (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
:
The term in the curly brackets on the right hand side shows that an in-
crease in the corporate tax rate has two e¤ects on the debt component of the
ETR. The rst is captured by the term  [  i (1  )]. As pointed out earlier,
since interest income is generally taxed less at personal level than at corporate
level,  > i (1  ). This implies that, as for the case of a TBI, an increase in
the corporate tax rate has the e¤ect of reducing the proportion of investment
cost nanced by retained earnings, hence reducing the benet of debt nanc-
ing relative to retained earnings, in turn increasing the ETR. The second term,
captured by (1  ) i, measures the benet arising from the higher proportion
of interest income deductible from the corporate tax base, which clearly reduces
the ETR as the corporate tax rate raises. Consequently, a TRI has two e¤ects
on the debt component of the ETR: on the one hand, it reduces the ETR by
increasing the proportion of the cost of capital nanced by borrowing; on the
other hand it increases the ETR by reducing the value of interest payments
deductible from the tax base.
3 Deferred taxation and the cost of capital
As anticipated in the introduction rms investing in the United States and in
the United Kingdom have to comply with accounting rules which prevent the
distribution to shareholders of any spare cash ow generated by deferred taxa-
tion. In particular, in any period t a rm has to set a provision equal to the tax
rate multiplied by the di¤erence between the capital allowance deductible for
tax purposes and the corresponding value deductible for accounting purposes.
This implies that dividend income in any period t cannot exceed the after-tax
prot reduced by the provision. The literature on accounting constraints and
corporate tax policy assumes accounting depreciation to be equal to economic
depreciation, which would imply a period t constraint on dividend policy writ-
ten as 
 
KTt   Kt

. We departure from this assumption and consider the
more general case in which accounting depreciation may di¤er from economic
depreciation. If we denote by  the accounting rate of depreciation and by Kt
the outstanding value of the capital stock for accounting purposes, the deferred
tax set in a generic period t, T dt ;can be written as
T dt = 
 
KTt   Kt

; (21)
As stated by Kanniainen and Södersten (1995), the positive temporary dif-
ference between the capital allowance and accounting depreciation give rise to
a deferred tax liability which must be retained by the rm rather than be dis-
tributed to shareholders. In principle, the constrained liquidity should be used
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to carry out new investment. However, this would be in conict with the model
assumption of a one-unit increase in capital in period t and an equal decrease
starting from t + 1. As a result, following Polito (2009), nancial resources
constrained in provisions for deferred taxes represent an excess of liquidity that
rms can only invest in the capital markets. In turn, this implies that deferred
taxation generates to shareholders a cash-ow equal to the after-tax rate of
return on the resources constrained in provisions for deferred taxes.
There are several equivalent ways of incorporating nancial constraints on
dividend policy into the neoclassical investment model. King (1974) and
Kanniainen and Södersten (1995) treat the dividend policy constraint just as an
extra constraint in the maximisation problem of the rm. Polito (2009) shows
that the nancial constraint can also be incorporated into the neoclassical model
by opportunely modifying the identity between sources and uses of funds. This
paper instead introduces nancial constraints into the model by specifying the
total tax liability of the rm in any period t, Tt, as the sum of current and
deferred taxes. In particular, the corporate tax function can be formulated as
Tt = T
c
t + T
d
t ; (22)
where current taxes T ct are dened as in equation (4), and T
d
t is dened in (21).
This shows that a new source tax liability arises to shareholders in the form of
undistributable tax savings. The formulation of the tax function in equations
(22) and (21) is essentially consistent with how rms report their tax liability in
their accounts, hence providing a very transparent way of disclosing the impact
of the constraint on dividend policy.10
We can now appraise how accounting constraints on dividend policy a¤ect
the cost of capital. In the rst period, under the standard theory, the capital
allowance reduces the cost of capital by  . Since accounting depreciation can
be deducted from period t = 1 onward, it follows that the entire value of the tax
saving generated by the rst year allowance cannot be distributed to shareholder
as it represents a deferred tax which has to be retained by the rm into a
provision for deferred taxes. This implies that the cost of capital increases in t
by  , which entirely neutralises the benet of the initial capital allowance.
In order to allow the possibility of interest income being taxed at a di¤erent
rate with respect to prots, we denote with  c the rate on interests at corporate
level. Thus resources accumulated in provisions for deferred taxes and invested
by the rm in the nancial market earn the after tax rate of return i (1   c).
This nancial return can be distributed to shareholders in turn contributing
to the reduction of the cost of capital by i (1   c) . Hence the net cost of
capital in the presence of accounting constraints on dividend policy is given by
1  i (1   c) . This shows that omission of the constraint, as in the standard
analysis, has the e¤ect of understating the net cost of investment faced by
shareholders. Equivalently, this shows that the benet of a TBI consisting in
a higher rst year capital allowance is considerably overstated by the standard
10For a detailed description of the rules for recording timing di¤erences in a companys
nancial statement, see Alexander and Archer (2009).
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analysis. Conversely, the negative e¤ect of a TRI through the rst year capital
allowance is much smaller than that predicted by the standard theory.
The rm also benets from the deduction of tax depreciation allowances
for t  1. If we denote by A = 
1P
s=1

1 
1+
s
= + the present discounted
value of the tax saving due to accounting depreciation, then the overall present
discounted value of provisions for deferred taxes, , is measured as
 = A  A
= +
 (  )
(+ ) (+ )
; (23)
which shows that with  =  we still have  > 0 because of the e¤ect of the
rst year allowance.
As we have seen the present discounted value of the corresponding nancial
return distributable to shareholders generated by the investment in the nancial
market of these resources is given by
i (1   c); (24)
Hence, equations (23) and (24) measure the impact of accounting constraint
on the cost of capital: on the one hand, accounting constraints on dividend
policy increase the cost of capital by preventing the distribution to shareholders
of any tax saving generated by capital allowances for depreciation, as measured
by  in equation (23). Since resources accumulated in provisions for deferred
taxes are invested in the nancial market, accounting constraints on dividend
policy generate a return in present value equal to i (1   c).
4 The ETR under constrained dividend policy
4.1 Retained earnings
After incorporating the denitions in equations (23) and (24) into equation (8),
the rent on investment nanced by retained earnings is written as
RC;RE =   f1 A + [1  i (1   c)]g+  (1  ) (p+ ) (1 + )
1 + 
+ (25)
+
 (1  ) (1 + )
1 + 
f1 A + [1  i (1   c)]g ;
where the subscript C denotes that dividend policy is "constrained" by the
accounting rules on deferred taxation. The above can be rearranged, using the
denition in (8), as
RC;RE = RU;RE +
 [1  i (1   c)]
1 + 
[(1  ) (1 + )  (1 + )]
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The second term on the right hand side shows the overall e¤ect of the accounting
constraint on the after tax economic rent under retained earnings nance.
Assuming that interest income and capital gains are taxed with the same
rate at personal level, so that  = i, the above becomes
RC;RE = RNC;RE    [1  i (1  
c)]
(1 + r)
(r + ) ;
which shows that the accounting constraint decreases the standard measure of
the economic rent whenever  > 0, i.e. tax depreciation exceeds accounting
depreciation.
Using the denition in (13), the above can be written as
RC;RE = RU;RE    [1  i (1  
c)] 
(1 + r)
A  A
A
;
which shows how the interplay between tax, accounting and economic deprecia-
tion a¤ects the impact of accounting constraint on dividend policy on the return
from capital investment. We notice that in general the sign of the constraint
is independent from economic depreciation as it is entirely determined by the
di¤erence between tax and accounting depreciation. It therefore follows that
RC;RE Q RU;RE if A R A. This results holds unless accounting depreciation
equals economic depreciation, as assumed in Kanniainen and Södersten (1994,
1995), in which case the above resolves to
RC;RE = RU;RE    [1  i (1  
c)] 
(1 + r)

A
A
  1

;
which implies that RC;RE Q RU;RE if A R A.
After combining the denition in (25) with (12), the ETR on investment
nanced by retained earnings in the presence of accounting constraints on divi-
dend policy can be written as
ETRC;RE =
R  RC;RE
p= (1 + r)
= ETRU;RE +
 [1  i (1   c)] (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
[(1  ) (1 + )  (1 + )]
(26)
which, in the special case of  = i, gives the solution
ETRC;RE = ETRU;RE +
 [1  i (1   c)]
p
(r + ) ;
which shows that the ETR is higher then in the absence of constraint whenever
tax depreciation exceeds accounting depreciation,  > 0.
We can di¤erentiate the above with respect to p to obtain
@ETRC;RE
@p
=
@ETRU;RE
@p
   [1  i (1  
c)] (r + )
p2
;
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which shows that the sensitiveness of the ETR to investment protability is
overstated by the standard literature.
We can now study the impact of tax policy changes on the ETR in the
presence of accounting constraints on dividend policy. A TBI results in
@ETRC;RE
@
=
@ETRU;RE
@
+
 [1  i (1   c)] (r + )
p
@A
@
:
Using the result in (15), the above can be written as
@ETRC;RE
@
= i (1   c) @ETRU;RE
@
;
which shows that once accounting constraints are incorporated into the ETR
the benet of TBIs is signicantly lower than under the unconstrained model.
To evaluate the e¤ect of a TRI in the presence of accounting constraints, we
di¤erentiate (26) with respect to the corporate tax rate to obtain
@ETRC;RE
@
=
@ETRU;RE
@
+
@
@


1  i  1   i(r + )
p
:
Using the result in equation (16), the above becomes
@ETRC;RE
@
= 

1 +

p
  i  1   i (r + )
p (r + )


   [1  i (1  
c)] (r + ) 
p (r + )
;
which can be compared with the corresponding expression from the uncon-
strained model in equation (16). Hence, the higher tax rate has the e¤ect of re-
ducing the tax base benet observed in the unconstrained model by 1 i (1   c).
In addition, the term  (r+)p(r+) measures the reduction of the ETR as a result
of the fall in the value of provisions for deferred taxes generated by the higher
tax rate levied on accounting depreciation.
The term i(1 
c)(r+)
p(r+) measures the increase in the ETR due to the lower
value of nancial resources to be invested in the nancial market.
Notice that the above can be written as
@ETRC;RE
@
=
@ETRU;RE
@
+
 [1  i (1   c)] (r + ) r (  )
p (r + ) (r + )
which shows that
@ETRC;RE
@
R @ETRU;RE
@
whenever  R . In other words, omission of the accounting constraint brings
misleading policy assessment of the impact of TRIs on the e¤ective tax burden
on income from capital.
Two special cases are worth considering. First, if accounting depreciation
equals economic depreciation,  =  the above reduces to
@ETRC;RE
@
= 

1 +

p
  i (1   c) (r + )
p (r + )


   [1  i (1  
c)] 
p
= 

1 + i (1   c) 
p
  i (1   c) (r + )
p (r + )


;
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which shows that the higher corporate tax rate has also a lower impact on the
gross return of the investment.
Second, if  =  and the after tax return from nancial investment is negli-
gible, i.e. i (1   c) ' 0, it follows that the above derivative equals : in other
words, there is no tax base e¤ect from a TRI.
4.2 New equity
When investment is nanced by new equity, in the rst period, the rm sets a
provision for deferred taxes of . Recall that accounting depreciation can only
be deducted from period t = 1 onward. Hence, in the rst period the rm has to
set a provision for deferred taxes equal to the tax rate multiplied by the entire
rst period capital allowance. This will earn a nancial return of i (1   c) .
Hence, the economic rent on investment nanced by new equity becomes under
accounting constraints
RC;NE = RC;RE  
 (1  ) 1  i  1   i 
1 + 
:
Using the denition in equation (25), the above can be written as
RC;NE = RU;NE  [1  i (1  
c)]
1 + 
[(1  ) (1 + )  (1 + )]  (1  ) [1  i (1  
c)] 
1 + 
;
which shows that accounting constraints on dividend policy add two e¤ects on
the return from investment nanced by new equity in (10), measured by the last
two terns on the right hand side of the above. The former term measures the
reduction of the overall return due to the impact of the accounting constraint on
the retained earning component of RC;NE . The last term measures the e¤ect
of the accounting constraint on the new equity component of the return: in
particular, this term is negative (positive) whenever dividend income is taxed
more (less),  < 1 ( > 1), than capital gains. Consequently, the ETR for
investment nanced with new equity becomes
ETRC;NE =
R  RC;NE
p= (1 + r)
= ETRC;RE + 
(1  ) 1  i  1   i  (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
; (27)
where the last term on the right hand side discloses the e¤ect of the accounting
constraint on the ETR when investment is nanced by new equity relative to
the case of retained earnings. It follows that
ETRC;NE R ETRU;NE
if  > , which shows that after considering accounting constraints on dividend
policy the ETR is higher than predicted by the standard theory.
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We can study how the ETR for investment nanced by new equity changes
following an increase in investment protability by di¤erentiating (27) with
respect to p to obtain
@ETRC;NE
@p
=
@ETRC;RE
@p
   (1  )

1  i  1   i  (1 + r)
(1 + ) p2
:
Notice that
@ETRC;NE
@p
Q @ETRU;RE
@p
when R ;
which shows that the sensitiveness of the ETR to a change in corporate prots
is overstated by the omission of the accounting constraint.
To appraise the e¤ect of a TBI, we di¤erentiate equation (27) with respect
to the rate of tax depreciation to obtain
@ETRC;NE
@
=
@ETRC;RE
@
   (1  ) (1 + r) [i (1  
c)  ]
(1 + ) p
:
Using the result in (18), the above becomes
@ETRC;NE
@
= i (1   c) @ETRU;RE
@
;
which shows that TBIs have a signicantly smaller impact on the ETR even in
the case of new equity nance.
The e¤ect of a TRI is studied by evaluating the derivative of (27) with
respect to the tax rate, given by
@ETRC;NE
@
=
@ETRC;RE
@
   (1  ) (1 + r) [i (1  
c)]
(1 + ) p
:
The above can also be written as
@ETRC;NE
@
=
@ETRU;NE
@
+
 [1  i (1   c)] (r + ) r (  )
p (r + ) (r + )
+
+ 
(1  ) (1 + r) [1  i (1   c)]
(1 + ) p
:
Note that if dividend income is not taxed less of capital gains,   1, then
@ETRC;NE
@ R
@ETRU;NE
@ as long as  R , which imply that a TRI is more
e¤ective than under the unconstrained model. The e¤ect is however ambiguous
when dividend income is taxed less than capital gains,  > 1.
4.3 Debt nance
Under debt nance the rm borrows in the rst period all resources necessary
to purchase the capital stock net of the rst period capital allowance. However,
the saving generated by tax allowance cannot be distributed to shareholders, as
the rm sets a provision for deferred taxes of . The provision will therefore
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generate an after tax nancial return of i (1   c) . This implies that the
net amount borrowed under the accounting constraint to purchase one unit of
capital is given by
1  i  1   i ;
and, consequently, the ETR on investment nanced by debt can be formulated
as
ETRC;B = ETRC;RE    [1  i (1  
c) ] [  i (1  )] (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
; (28)
which is generally lower than under retained earnings. We can now measure the
sensitiveness of the ETRC;B to an increase in protability by
@ETRC;B
@p
=
@ETRC;RE
@p
+
 [1  i (1   c) ] [  i (1  )] (1 + r)
(1 + ) p2
or equivalently by
@ETRC;B
@p
=
@ETRU;B
@p
   [1  i (1  
c)] (1 + r)
(1 + ) p2
[(1  ) (1 + )  (1 + )]
+
 [1  i (1   c)] [  i (1  )] (1 + r)
(1 + ) p2
:
Hence an increase in investment protability under accounting constraints on
dividend policy adds two e¤ects to the ETR measured for debt nance in the
unconstrained model. First, the higher protability reduces the net burden
of the undistributed dividend income due to the presence of the accounting
constraint, which in turn reduces the ETR. Second, the higher protability
reduces the benet from debt nance under the accounting constraint, in turn
increasing the ETR.
The impact of a TBI on the ETR in equation (28) is measured by
@ETRC;B
@
=
@ETRC;RE
@
+
@
@
 [i (1   c)  ] [  i (1  )] (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
:
Using (20), the above becomes
@ETRC;B
@
= i (1   c) @ETRU;B
@
which shows that - as for retained earnings and new equity nance - the omission
of the accounting constraint signicantly overstates the e¤ect of TBIs on the
ETR when investment is nanced by debt. Finally, a change in the corporate
income tax rate gives
@ETRC;B
@
=
@ETRC;RE
@
+
 (1 + r) [i (1   c)] [  i (1  )]
(1 + ) p
   [1  i (1  
c) ] i (1 + r)
(1 + ) p
;
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which shows that the higher tax rate has two further e¤ects on the ETR under
debt nance relative to the retained earnings case. First, the higher tax rate
increases the tax burden on the nancial investment of resources accumulated in
provisions for deferred taxes, in turn increasing the ETR. On the other hand, the
higher tax rate increases the tax saving from the deduction of interest payments
from the tax base, hence reducing the ETR.
5 Data
Figures 1 and 2 provide a picture of how taxation of income from capital has
changed in the United States and in the United Kingdom respectively dur-
ing periods of economic recession, or immediately after, over the last thirty
years.11 Each gure reports the headline corporate tax rate (CIT); top mar-
ginal individual tax rates levied on dividend income (PIT+CIT) and capital
gains (CGT+CIT); and the net present value of tax depreciation allowances
granted on one unit of investment in either plant and machinery or industrial
buildings, denoted with NPV(PM) and NPV(IB) respectively.12 Shaded areas
denote years of economic recession, which occurred in both countries in the
early 1980s, the early 1990 and during the period 2007-2009, and in the United
States alone following the collapse of the speculative dot-com bubble in the early
2000s.13
To understand changes in taxation of income from capital occurred during,
or following, years of economic recession in the United States and the United
Kingdom, it is essential to bear in mind that tax reforms in both countries have
been characterised by two well known trends, which are clearly visible in Figures
1 and 2: the steady reduction of tax rates at both corporate and personal level,
and the broadening of the corporate tax base brought about by the decline of
tax depreciation allowances for capital spending.
If we now focus on specic tax changes during recessions in the United States,
we observe that the early 1980s and 2000s periods are characterised by high tax
depreciation allowances for investment in plant and machinery, increasing tax
depreciation allowances for investment in industrial buildings, and declining tax
rates on dividend income and capital gains. No signicant changes in the corpo-
rate tax system occurred in response to the early 1990s period, since tax rates
on corporate and dividend income had been already considerably reduced by
11Full details of all tax data employed in this paper are provided in the Annex at the end
of the paper.
12PIT+CIT and CGT+CIT are measured taking into account tax rates levied on dividend
and capital gains at both corporate and personal level, and any form of relief granted to reduce
the e¤ect of double taxation.
13Recessions are measured by considering time periods elapsing between the start of a
peak and the end of a trough in the 1979-2010 time series of the output gap (measured as
the percentage deviation of actual real GDP from HP trend GDP) taken from Datastream
for both countries. As a result, recessions are identied over the periods 1978Q4-1980Q3,
1981Q1-1982Q4, 1990Q1-1991Q4, 2000Q2-2001Q4 and 2007Q3-2009Q2 for the United States;
and over the periods 1979Q2-1981Q2, 1988Q4-1992Q2, and 2008Q1-2009Q3 for the United
Kingdom.
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the Reagan tax reform in 1986. During the latest recession the main tax change
was the increase in tax depreciation allowances for investment in plant and ma-
chinery; while tax rates on corporate and dividend income remained unchanged,
and capital gains tax rates increased. In the United Kingdom, the early 1980s
recession is characterised, as in the United States, by high tax depreciation al-
lowances for investment in plant and machinery and increasing tax depreciation
allowances for investment in industrial buildings. Tax rates remained unchanged
during the early 1980s recession, but were signicantly reduced immediately af-
ter. These tax rate cuts were accompanied by simultaneous reduction of tax
depreciation allowances for capital spending which had the e¤ect of broadening
the tax base. As a result, in the early 1990s recession, the only key corporate
tax reform was a temporary increase in tax depreciation allowances for both
plant and machinery and industrial buildings. Similarly, the main corporate
tax change occurred in the United Kingdom in the 2007-2009 recession was the
temporary increase in tax depreciation allowances for plant and machinery.
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Figure 1: United States, taxation of income from capital, 1979-2010.
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Figure 2: United Kingdom, taxation of income from capital, 1979-2010.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Benchmark case
We provide a quantitative assessment of the analytical results discussed so far,
by comparing and contrasting the development of ETRs computed from the
constrained and unconstrained models, with a special focus on the impact of
corporate tax changes occurred during periods of recessions, or immediately
after. We start by setting up a benchmark calibration of the model, based on
a domestic investment in plant and machinery, accounting depreciation equal
to economic depreciation ( = ), and taxation at corporate level alone ( =
1). Following Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998b, 2003), we assume that plant and
machinery depreciate at 12.25 per cent on a declining balance basis, the real
interest rate is 10 per cent, the ination rate is 3.5 per cent and absence of taxes
on interest income ( = i). We carry out the benchmark computation under
the assumption that investment can earn either a low or a high rate of nancial
return, corresponding with p equal to either 10 or 100 per cent respectively.
Figures 3 and 4 plot ETRs in the United States computed from the uncon-
strained and the constrained model for this benchmark case when investment
is nanced with retained earnings and debt respectively.14 In both gures we
also plot the statutory tax rate on corporate income (STR) which in the case
of taxation at corporate level only corresponds with CIT.
Three main features can be observed for the United States. First, changes
in investment protability have a larger impact under the unconstrained model,
which tends to overstate the e¤ect on the base of depreciation allowances: in-
deed for retained earnings nance, the average percentage ETR obtained from
the unconstrained model is 16.4 for low return investment and 39.2 for high
return investment; whereas, the constrained model predicts average percentage
ETRs of 41.1 and 41.6 respectively. Similarly, for debt nanced investment, we
observe that the gap between the average ETRs is about 67 per cent under the
unconstrained model and 50 per cent under the constrained model.
Second, under retained earnings nance, the standard analysis suggests
that low return investment project benet signicantly more than high return
projects from TBIs temporarily granted in the United States in the early 1980s,
2000s and in the late 2000s. In contrast, TBIs have little e¤ect on the ETR
under the constrained model, regardless of the level of investment protability.
Third, under debt nancing, TBIs appear to have little impact on the ETR,
which instead responds signicantly to TRIs: in fact, under both models the
ETR display a signicant shift following the corporate income tax rate cuts
occurred in both countries during the mid 1980s. However, the direction of this
shift predicted by the two models is considerably di¤erent. We recall from the
14As noted above, when considering taxation at corporate level alone, the ETR for retained
earnings nance is equal to that under new equity nance.
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previous sections that a TRI reduces the benet of debt nancing by decreasing
(i) the value of interest rate deduction from the corporate income tax base
and (ii) the present discounted value of the tax saving generated by capital
allowances: both these e¤ects tend to increase the ETR. On the other hand, a
TRI reduces the tax levied on the rate of return generated by the investment, in
turn reducing the ETR. When investment protability is low, this latter e¤ect
is more than compensated by the former two: hence the ETR on low return
investment increases from -47.3 to -27.4 per cent in the unconstrained model
and from -17.2 to 12.9 per cent in the constrained model. However, for high
protable investment the opposite e¤ect occurs, and the ETR declines from
39.9 to 31.8 per cent in the unconstrained model and from 42.9 to 33.2 in the
constrained model.
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Figure 3: United States, ETR on domestic investment in plant and machinery
nanced by retained earnings, taxation at corporate level only, 1979-2010.
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Figure 4: United States, ETR on domestic investment in plant and machinery
nanced by debt, taxation at corporate level only, 1979-2010.
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Figures 5 and 6 shows that similar patterns can be observed also for the
United Kingdom: the standard analysis signicantly amplies the variation of
the ETRs over investment protability for both retained earnings and debt
nance; overstates the benet of temporary TBIs, especially when investment
is nanced by retained earnings and yields a low rate of return.
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Figure 5: United Kingdom, ETR on domestic investment nanced in plant and
machinery by retained earnings, taxation at corporate level only, 1979-2010.
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Figure 6: United Kingdom, ETR on domestic investment nanced in plant and
machinery by debt, taxation at corporate level only, 1979-2010.
6.2 Robustness analysis
The previous evidence suggests that, after taking into account constraints on
dividend policy determined by accounting rules, TRIs are more e¤ective in re-
ducing the ETR than TBIs. We next explore the robustness of this proposition
along a number of dimensions. In particular, we examine the impact of taxa-
tion at shareholders level ( 6= 1); the e¤ect of investment in alternative types
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of assets such as industrial buildings; and the e¤ect of accounting depreciation
di¤erent from economic depreciation ( 6= ).
6.2.1 Personal taxation
We introduce personal taxes, and consider a domestic investment in plant and
machinery, which earns a rate of return p of 40 per cent and it is nanced by
either retained earnings or new equities or debt. Hence, we add to the previous
analysis the e¤ect of top marginal tax rates on dividend income and capital
gains levied at shareholders level and the integration system between taxation
at corporate and personal level. Our results are graphed in Figure 7 for the
United States and Figure 8 for the United Kingdom. In both gures, STR
denotes the headline tax rate at shareholders level. We observe the following
features.
First, ETRs increase in both countries when considering taxation at share-
holder level since neither the United States nor the United Kingdom provide
full integration for the double taxation at corporate and personal level of cap-
ital income. Second, ETRs measured from the constrained model are always
above those obtained from the unconstrained model for each type of investment
nance. Third, in both countries the intertemporal evolution of the ETR ap-
pear to follow the pattern of the combined e¤ective tax rate (STR) regardless
of the form of investment nance. Fourth, even when considering taxation at
personal level, the unconstrained model appear to overstate the e¤ect of TBIs
on the ETRs. For instance, the constrained model shows that the increase in
tax allowances granted in the United States during the last recession lead to
a percentage reduction of the ETR of 1.5 under retained earnings nance, 2.8
under new equity nance, and 1.9 under debt nance, while the constrained
model predicts percentage reductions of 3.4, 4.9 and 2.2 respectively. Similarly,
in the United Kingdom, the increase from 20 to 40 per cent of tax depreciation
allowances granted in the 2009 HM Budget Revenue lead to a percentage reduc-
tion in the ETR of 0.2, 0.3 and 0.2 for retained earnings, new equity and debt
nance respectively, while the constrained model predicts that the reduction
was instead of 2.3, 2.6 and 1.8 per cent respectively. In contrast, a signicant
decline of the ETR can be observed in both countries as a result of the decline of
the combined statutory tax rate, as for example in the United States following
the Reagan tax reform in the mid 1980s and the recession of early 2000s; and in
the United Kingdom during the 1980s. Finally, we notice that under the con-
strained model ETRs for investment nanced by new equity are above the STR
from 1979 to 1986 in the United States, and from 1979 to 1983 in the United
Kingdom. In both countries, during these periods of time, the value of the pa-
rameter  is less than one, since taxation of dividend income was higher relative
to capital gains. This implies that new equity nance was a less e¢ cient form
of investment nance, hence the ETRs for new equity is systematic above the
corresponding measure for retained earnings nance. The extra burden of new
equity nance is particularly relevant during the rst half of the 1980s, since in
both countries top marginal tax rates on dividend income were extremely high
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and partial (United Kingdom) or no relief (United States) for double taxation
was granted to shareholders. This results in ETRs above the STR under the
constrained model. In the unconstrained model this e¤ect is mitigated by the
fact that shareholders still benet from the distribution of the tax saving gen-
erated from tax depreciation allowances, while this does not occur under the
constrained model, which does not allow cash ow distribution to shareholders
out of TBIs. The reductions in the combined tax rates occurred in the United
States in 1987 (from 66.01 to 57.59 per cent) and in the United Kingdom in 1984
(from 72.77 to 59.89) are signicant enough to reduce the cost of new equity
nance relative to retained earnings, hence reducing the corresponding ETR for
new equity nance below the STR.
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Figure 7: United States, ETR on domestic investment in plant and machinery
nanced, p=40%, taxation at shareholders level, 1979-2010.
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Figure 8: United Kingdom, ETR on domestic investment in plant and
machinery nanced, p=40%, taxation at shareholders level, 1979-2010.
28
6.2.2 Industrial buildings
We extend our analysis of the benchmark scenario to compute ETRs on domestic
investment in industrial buildings. In particular, Figures 9 and 10 consider
ETRs on industrial buildings investment nanced by retained earnings and debt
in the United States, while Figures 11 and 12 consider the corresponding ETRs
in the United Kingdom.
The constrained model shows that ETRs in the United States on domestic
investment in industrial buildings nanced by retained earnings follow the dy-
namic patters of the statutory tax rate and show little response to TBIs. As
for the case of plant and machinery, the benet of higher tax depreciation al-
lowances granted during the early 1980s recession is largely overstated by the
standard analysis, and signicantly dependent on the level of investment prof-
itability under the standard model. Notice how the constrained model predicts
ETRs on industrial buildings above the statutory tax rate for the whole period
1979-2010, while ETRs are predicted to be above the STR from 1987 onward
under the unconstrained model. This is because until 1987, the ETR under
the unconstrained model is already close to the headline STR. Hence, once the
benet of tax depreciation is removed by the constrained model, the ETRs is
marginally above the headline rate. After 1987, the tax depreciation allowance
rate on investment in industrial buildings is reduced in the United States to
3 per cent, which is therefore lower than the 4 per cent rate of economic de-
preciation for investment in industrial buildings assumed in the simulation. As
a result of having tax depreciation allowances which do not fully cover eco-
nomic depreciation, shareholders face a cost of capital higher than 1 since 1987,
which leads to ETRs higher than the STR. This e¤ect is further exacerbated in
the constrained model as shareholders pay anticipated taxes. The gap between
the ETRs and the STR on industrial buildings further increases after the tax
depreciation allowance rate is further reduced to 2.6 per cent in 1993.
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Figure 9: United States, ETR on domestic investment in industrial buildings
nanced by retained earnings, taxation at corporate level only, 1979-2010.
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Figure 10: United States, ETR on domestic investment in industrial buildings
nanced by debt, taxation at corporate level only, 1979-2010.
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Figure 11: United Kingdom, ETR on domestic investment in industrial
buildings nanced by retained earnings, taxation at corporate level only,
1979-2010.
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Figure 12: United Kingdom, ETR on domestic investment in industrial
buildings nanced by debt, taxation at corporate level only, 1979-2010.
6.2.3 Change in accounting depreciation
Figures 13 and 14 complete the empirical analysis for the United States and
the United Kingdom by relaxing the assumption that accounting depreciation
equals economic depreciation. This is accomplished by retaining the assumption
that both accounting and economic depreciation are computed on a declining
balance basis, and then changing the accounting depreciation rate while keeping
constant the rate of economic depreciation. We consider the case of domestic
investment in plant and machinery earning a nancial return of 40 per cent.
Changes in the accounting depreciation rate have no e¤ect in the unconstrained
model, while under the constrained model they impact on the size of provi-
sions for deferred taxes accumulated over time by rms. For both countries, we
compute ETRs when  = 0, 10 and 20 per cent; and report the corresponding
measures obtained when  =  and under the unconstrained model. As pointed
out in the analytical section, the sign of provisions for deferred taxes depends on
the di¤erence between tax and accounting depreciation, and it is not a¤ected by
economic depreciation. Hence, given economic and tax depreciation, a reduc-
tion of the accounting depreciation rate has the e¤ect of increasing the size of
provisions for deferred taxes, hence the measure of the ETR obtained from the
constrained model. Vice-versa, the e¤ect of an increase in the rate of accounting
depreciation reduces the ETR as it decreases the size of provision for deferred
taxes. As the rate of accounting depreciation becomes signicantly higher than
the rate of economic depreciation ETR falls below the STR. All these e¤ects are
clearly visible in the two gures below. Most importantly, we notice that all our
previous evidence on the greater e¤ectiveness of TRIs relative to TBIs in reduc-
ing the ETR on income from capital during periods of economic recessions are
still valid, regardless of the assumption on the rate of accounting depreciation.
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Figure 13: United States, ETR on domestic investment plant and machinery
nanced by retained earnings under alternative accounting depreciation rates,
taxation at corporate level only, 1979-2010.
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Figure 14: United Kingdom, ETR on domestic investment plant and
machinery nanced by retained earnings under alternative accounting
depreciation rates, taxation at corporate level only, 1979-2010.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyses the e¤ectiveness of corporate tax incentives in reducing
the tax burden on income from capital. We compare tax base and tax rate
incentives within an investment model obtained by incorporating nancial con-
straints on dividend policy into the framework for the computation of the ETR
devised by Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998b, 2003). The need of considering -
nancial constraints on dividend income when comparing tax rate and tax base
incentives in tax policy analysis arises because most of tax base incentives are
temporary in nature and result in deferred taxation. Accounting rules in both
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the United States and the United Kingdom prevent cash ows resulting from
deferred taxes to be distributed to shareholders. Hence, omission of the con-
straints would result in an incorrect assessment of the e¤ect of tax incentives
and their implications for the measurement of the tax burden on investment.
We re-compute time series of the ETR under the new constrained model in
both the United States and the United Kingdom over the period 1980-2010. The
new empirical results show - in sharp contrast with the existing evidence - that
tax rate incentives are far more e¤ective in reducing the ETR than tax base
incentives. This result holds regards to the form of investment nance, the type
of capital spending and the value of economic depreciation relative to accounting
depreciation. Also, our analysis warns policy makers about a potential negative
implication of current trends in corporate tax rates: as corporate tax rates
continue to decline over time, there will be less and less scope to employ the
most e¤ective tax instrument, the corporate tax rate, to reduce the e¤ective
tax burden on income from capital during periods of economic recessions or
downturns. In turn, this suggests that corporate tax rate cuts should also be
temporary.
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A Tax data
Tables 1 and 2 report all tax data used in the empirical section of this paper.
CIT denotes the statutory corporate income tax rate, inclusive of surcharges
and local tax rates, where they exist. NPV(PM) and NPV(IB) denotes the
discounted present value of tax depreciation allowances on one unit of capital
spending in plant and machinery and industrial buildings respectively. PIT is
the top marginal individual tax rate on dividend income and c denotes the relief
granted to reduce the e¤ects of double taxation. In particular, we notice that a
classical system (no relief for double taxation) is employed in the United States
throughout the whole sample period, whereas a credit system is used in the
United Kingdom, with imputation rate declinging from 42.9 per cent in 1979
to 11.1 per cent in 2010. CGT is the top marginal tax rate on capital gains, while
g measures the percentage of the gain chargable after taking into account any
form of double taxation relief. A 60 per cent exemption was granted on capital
gains in the United States from 1979 to 1986, and no relief for double taxation
was available afterwards. Relief for double taxation of capital gains on qualied
participations is granted in the United Kingdom from 1998 to 2007. In table 2,
the percentage of chargable capital gain is computed after measuring the average
value tapering relief each year. Finally, the rate Z is the the accruals-equivalent
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capital gains tax rate, measured by making the assumption that, following an
increase in the value of an asset, the investor sells 10 per cent of his remaining
holding in each period.
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Table 1: Capital income taxation data, United States, 1979-2010
year CIT NPV(PM) NPV(IB) PIT c CGT g Z
1979 49.6 86.9 43.1 42.9 0 28 40 7.9
1980 49.6 86.9 43.1 42.9 0 28 40 7.9
1981 49.6 87.3 56.1 42.9 0 23.7 40 6.7
1982 49.6 87.3 56.1 37.7 0 20 40 4.7
1983 49.6 87.3 56.1 35.6 0 20 40 4.7
1984 49.6 87.3 56.1 35.1 0 20 40 4.7
1985 49.6 87.3 56.1 35.3 0 20 40 4.7
1986 49.6 87.3 56.1 32.6 0 20 40 4.7
1987 38.4 78.5 26.6 31.2 0 28 0 15.1
1988 38.4 78.5 26.6 28.2 0 28 0 14.0
1989 38.4 78.5 26.6 28.4 0 28 0 14.0
1990 38.4 78.5 26.6 28.3 0 28 0 14.0
1991 38.4 78.5 26.6 28.9 0 28 0 14.3
1992 38.4 78.5 25.8 28.7 0 28 0 14.3
1993 39.3 78.5 21.2 30.2 0 28 0 15.2
1994 39.3 78.5 21.2 30.6 0 28 0 15.2
1995 39.3 78.5 21.2 31.3 0 28 0 15.2
1996 39.3 78.5 21.2 31.7 0 28 0 15.2
1997 39.3 78.5 21.2 33.2 0 20 0 10.9
1998 39.3 78.5 21.2 32.1 0 20 0 10.9
1999 39.3 78.5 21.2 32.6 0 20 0 10.9
2000 39.3 78.5 21.2 32.5 0 20 0 10.9
2001 39.3 78.5 21.2 32.0 0 20 0 10.8
2002 39.3 83.0 21.2 30.1 0 20 0 10.8
2003 39.3 87.6 21.2 17.8 0 15 0 7.9
2004 39.3 87.6 21.2 18.0 0 15 0 7.9
2005 39.3 78.5 21.2 18.3 0 15 0 7.9
2006 39.3 78.5 21.2 18.1 0 15 0 7.9
2007 39.3 78.5 21.2 18.1 0 15 0 7.9
2008 39.3 87.6 21.2 17 0 15 0 7.9
2009 39.3 87.6 21.2 17 0 20 0 10.5
2010 39.3 78.5 21.2 17 0 20 0 10.5
Notes: All data are in percentage. CIT=corporate income tax rate;
NPV(PM)=net present value 1 unit investment in plant and ma-
chinery; NPV(IB)=net present value 1 unit investment in industrial
buildings; PIT=Top marginal individual tax rate on dividend income;
c=imputation rate on dividend income; CGT=capital gains tax rate;
g=proportion of chargable gain; Z=e¤ective tax rate on accrued capi-
tal gains. Sources: Citizens for Tax Justice (www.ctj.org); Devereux
et al. (2007); Institute for Fiscal Studies, International Tax Data
(www.ifs.org.uk); and OECD Tax Database (www.oecd.org).
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Table 2: Capital income taxation data, United Kingdom, 1979-2010
year CIT NPV(PM) NPV(IB) PIT c CGT g Z
1979 52 100.0 73.2 75 42.9 30 0 19.3
1980 52 100.0 73.2 75 42.9 30 0 19.3
1981 52 100.0 93.2 75 42.9 30 0 19.3
1982 52 100.0 93.2 75 42.9 30 0 19.3
1983 50 100.0 93.2 75 42.9 30 0 19.3
1984 45 91.1 76.4 60 42.9 30 0 19.3
1985 40 82.2 55.0 60 42.9 30 0 19.3
1986 35 73.3 31.6 60 40.8 30 0 19.3
1987 35 73.3 31.6 60 37.0 30 0 19.3
1988 35 73.3 31.6 40 33.3 40 0 21.8
1989 35 73.3 31.6 40 33.3 40 0 21.8
1990 34 73.3 31.6 40 33.3 40 0 21.8
1991 33 73.3 31.6 40 33.3 40 0 21.8
1992 33 73.3 31.6 40 33.3 40 0 21.8
1993 33 78.6 50.4 40 25.0 40 0 21.8
1994 33 73.3 31.6 40 25.0 40 0 21.8
1995 33 73.3 31.6 40 25.0 40 0 21.8
1996 33 73.3 31.6 40 25.0 40 0 21.8
1997 31 73.3 31.6 40 25.0 40 0 21.8
1998 31 73.3 31.6 40 25.0 40 66.3 14.5
1999 30 73.3 31.6 40 11.1 40 66.3 14.5
2000 30 73.3 31.6 32.5 11.1 40 46.3 10.1
2001 30 73.3 31.6 32.5 11.1 40 46.3 10.1
2002 30 73.3 31.6 32.5 11.1 40 35 7.6
2003 30 73.3 31.6 32.5 11.1 40 35 7.6
2004 30 73.3 31.6 32.5 11.1 40 35 7.6
2005 30 73.3 31.6 32.5 11.1 40 35 7.6
2006 30 73.3 31.6 32.5 11.1 40 35 7.6
2007 30 73.3 31.6 32.5 11.1 40 35 7.6
2008 28 67.3 31.6 32.5 11.1 18 0 9.8
2009 28 84.6 31.6 32.5 11.1 18 0 9.8
2010 28 67.3 31.6 42.5 11.1 28 0 16.5
Notes: All data are in percentage. CIT=corporate income tax rate;
NPV(PM)=net present value 1 unit investment in plant and machin-
ery; NPV(IB)=net present value 1 unit investment in industrial buildings;
PIT=Top marginal individual tax rate on dividend income; c=imputation
rate on dividend income; CGT=capital gains tax rate; g=proportion of char-
gable gain; Z=e¤ective tax rate on accrued capital gains. Sources: Dev-
ereux et al. (2007); HMRC (www.hmrc.gov.uk); Institute for Fiscal Stud-
ies, International Tax Data (www.ifs.org.uk); and OECD Tax Database
(www.oecd.org).
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